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INTRODUCTION 
 While running from the police, Defendant fired six shots at Officer 
Cory Tsouras, hitting him in the chest once. Fortunately, Officer Tsouras was 
wearing a bullet-proof vest.  At trial, the State presented 18 witnesses and 191 
exhibits that detailed the shooting. The State also presented evidence of 
Defendant’s flight from police and how Defendant was identified as the 
shooter. 
 On appeal, Defendant first challenges his attempted aggravated 
murder conviction, arguing that insufficient evidence supported his 
identification as the shooter. In an unpreserved claim, Defendant challenges 
his obstruction of justice conviction, arguing that, like his attempted 
-2- 
aggravated murder conviction, insufficient evidence supported his 
identification as the person who discarded the gun. Both claims fail for the 
same reasons. A video showed Defendant firing a gun in the direction of 
Tsouras, the gun used in the shooting was found near where Defendant 
jumped a retaining wall while fleeing police, Defendant was the only person 
in the area fleeing, and one of the bullet casing recovered from the scene 
matched a bullet found in the truck Defendant had stolen.  
 Defendant next challenges the trial court’s admission of the Federal 
bullet that police found in Defendant’s pocket when they arrested him.  
Defendant argues that the trial court should have excluded the bullet as 
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. But the bullet was circumstantial evidence 
linking Defendant to the crime—it was the same brand as bullets found in the 
truck Defendant had stolen.  
 Last, Defendant argues that the trial court should have merged all five 
of his felony discharge of a firearm convictions with his attempted 
aggravated murder conviction. But the aggravated murder statute explicitly 
prohibits merging felony discharge of a firearm with aggravated murder.  
Defendant got a windfall when the court merged one. 
-3- 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 Issue 1a. Defendant was tried for the attempted murder of police officer 
Tsouras.  Among other evidence, (1) a video showed Defendant firing a gun 
in the direction of Tsouras, (2) Defendant was the only person in the area 
fleeing, and (3) one of the bullet casings recovered from the scene matched a 
bullet found in the truck Defendant had stolen.  Was the evidence sufficient 
to support the jury’s attempted aggravated murder verdict? 
 Standard of Review.  This Court must “review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury.” State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 Issue 1b. Was the evidence so plainly insufficient that the trial court 
erred in submitting the obstruction of justice charge to the jury where the 
evidence was sufficient to submit the obstruction charge to the jury? 
 Standard of Review. On unpreserved sufficiency challenges, Defendant 
“must demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction,” and “second that the insufficiency was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury.” See 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶17, 10 P.3d 346.  
-4- 
 Issue 1c. Did the trial court erroneously deny Defendant’s motion to 
exclude the Federal bullet found in his pocket? 
 Standard of Review. This Court upholds the trial court’s evidentiary 
ruling unless “the trial court so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood 
that injustice resulted.” State v. Otterson, 2008 UT App 139, ¶14, 184 P.3d 604 
(quotations and citations omitted).   
 Issue 2. Did the trial court erroneously deny Defendant’s motion to 
merge his four felony discharge of a firearm convictions with his attempted 
aggravated murder conviction? 
 Standard of Review.  “[W]hether one crime is a lesser included offense, 
which merges with a greater included offense, is a legal question of statutory 
interpretation reviewed for correctness.”  State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶6, 122 
P.3d 615. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts.2 
 
 While running from the police, Defendant shot Officer Cory Tsouras in 
the chest. R801-07,816-17. 
****** 
                                              
2 Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are recited in the light 
most favorable to the verdict. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶3, 299 P.3d 892. 
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 In October 2015, Defendant stole a truck and “six or seven” guns from 
the truck owner’s house. R1121-22. However, Defendant did not steal from 
the truck owner a 9 mm handgun—the type of weapon used to shoot and 
shoot at Officer Tsouras. Id., R1127; State’s Exhibit (SE)161. 
 A few weeks later, on October 30, 2015, around 8 p.m., Defendant, 
wearing a bandana, a dark leather jacket, a red or maroon shirt, blue jeans, 
and white shoes, drove the stolen truck to a business center at a strip mall. 
R843, see also 1310 (At trial, Defendant admitted that he was at the business 
center and on surveillance video); SE12,151-153.  
 Officer Nathan Clark was in the business center parking lot when he 
noticed the stolen truck. R843; SE11,143. As Clark investigated whether the 
truck was stolen, Defendant walked up to the truck and opened the driver 
side door. R854; SE11. When Defendant saw Clark, he ran. R854; SE11. Clark 
informed dispatch that he was chasing a white male in his thirties wearing 
blue jeans, a bandana, and a black leather jacket. R855; SE11.  
 Defendant ran through two adjacent parking lots towards a retail store. 
R855-56.  
 Officer Cory Tsouras, in response to Clark’s dispatch parked nearby 
and could see that Defendant—and only Defendant—was running from 
Clark. R789-90; SE11. Tsouras watched Defendant run to the adjacent retail 
-6- 
store parking lot. R797,855-56. There, Defendant bumped into the retail 
store’s night manager, and told her to “get the fuck out of my way.” R1195. 
The manager did not see anyone else running in the area and described 
Defendant as “taller,” with a “pointed nose,” “sharp looking, almost like 
wolf’s eyes,” wearing “dark pants,” and a dark jacket.  R1195,1198-99. 
 As Defendant ran through the retail store’s parking lot, Tsouras drove 
to the retail store to pursue Defendant. R798. When Tsouras saw Defendant—
a male matching the description Clark gave, wearing a black jacket, blue 
jeans, and a “beanie, skull cap-type head gear”—run into tire store parking 
lot, he pursued him in his patrol car. R797-98,800; SE142.   
 Gary Midgely, who was across the street, watched Defendant run from 
the retail store parking lot to the tire store. R938; SE13,145. Midgely saw only 
Defendant running in the area. R940. Midgely described Defendant wearing 
dark pants and a jacket and was not “100 percent sure,” but thought the jacket 
was light-colored. R941,953-54. Midgely explained that he was focused on 
what Defendant was doing, not what he was wearing. R952. Midgely saw 
Tsouras’s patrol car catch up with Defendant in the tire store’s parking lot, 
but the patrol car blocked his view of Defendant. R941-42,943; SE145. 
However, Midgely could still see Tsouras’s patrol car and heard six to eight 
-7- 
rapid gunshots as soon as Tsouras’s patrol car was parallel with Defendant. 
R942-43,944; SE145. 
 When Defendant ran on the passenger side his patrol car, Tsouras saw 
the muzzle of Defendant’s gun flash and radioed “shots fired, shots fired.” 
R801-02; SE11. It was 8:32 p.m. R1160; SE11. Tsouras did not stop to engage 
Defendant, but instead drove away from Defendant because the patrol car is 
“literally a coffin.” R803,943; SE143. As he drove to the adjacent carwash 
parking lot, Tsouras heard Defendant fire four more times and saw three 
more muzzle flashes from Defendant’s gun. R804-05. 
 Officer Andrew O’Gwin responded to the tire store parking lot just as 
Tsouras drove away and Defendant continued to fire at Tsouras. R945,1210. 
O’Gwin saw Defendant—wearing blue jeans, a dark hoodie, and white 
shoes—shoot his gun multiple times. R1210-12,1223; SE147.  
 Defendant fired six shots at Tsouras. R1052-55,1072. “Every single 
window” in Tsouras’s patrol car was either “blown out or shattered.” 
R863,1056; SE33. Four bullets hit Tsouras’s patrol car; one of those bullets hit 
Tsouras in the chest. R1095-96; SE136-141,156,157.  
 The bullet that hit Tsouras entered the front passenger-side door of his 
patrol car, went through the laptop sitting in the front passenger seat, and hit 
-8- 
Tsouras in the chest. R1081-82,1091-92; SE95,110-114. Tsouras’ bulletproof 
vest stopped the bullet. R816-17;R154,157; SE135-141,157.  
 A second bullet hit the passenger-side back window and ricocheted off 
the printer that sat on top of the front passenger seat headrest. R1080-81,1086-
91,1098; SE78-83,100-109. The bullet then fragmented into two pieces. R1080-
81. Both bullet fragments entered Tsouras’s headrest, with one lodging in 
Tsouras’s headrest and the other exiting out the back driver-side window. 
R1081; SE95. The third bullet hit the passenger-side front wheel well. 
R1060,1081-96; SE48,91-93,115-118. The fourth bullet hit the passenger-side 
top right corner of the patrol car. R1060-61,1083,1096; SE49,89,90.   
 The fifth and sixth bullets did not hit either Tsouras or the patrol car, 
but their casings were found in the tire store’s parking lot. R1052-55; SE13-
19,21-28,30,31. All the bullets came from the same Hi-point 9 mm handgun. 
R1072-73.  One bullet was a 9 mm Ruger and the other five bullets were 9 mm 
Winchesters. R19,22,23,26,28,31. 
 After shooting Tsouras, Defendant ran and disappeared from 
Tsouras’s view. R804. Tsouras thought he saw Defendant at the carwash and 
shot at the person that he thought was Defendant, but instead of shooting 
Defendant, Tsouras mistakenly shot an innocent bystander. R807. 
-9- 
 However, Defendant did not run towards the carwash. He ran to the 
north side of the tire store parking lot. R1210-11; SE147. O’Gwin saw 
Defendant running and commanded him to “Get on the ground” several 
times. R1212. Defendant ignored O’Gwin’s commands and ducked behind a 
dumpster. R1213-14; SE147. Defendant then fired at O’Gwin and jumped the 
retaining wall into the Park Station Apartments. R1213-14; SE147. O’Gwin’s 
dash cam did not capture Defendant’s face, but showed Defendant wearing 
blue jeans, a dark jacket, and white shoes and firing his gun towards the 
carwash—the same direction that Tsouras drove—and jumping the retaining 
wall. R804-05; SE147. 
 One minute after Tsouras radioed “shots fired,” a containment area 
was set-up. R1160-62; SE11. A containment area is like a “human fence,” 
where officers are positioned to keep an area enclosed to contain a potential 
suspect. R901,999,1161-62. Over thirty officers responded to the containment 
area that was north, east, west, and south of the tire store. R1160-61. Officers 
stationed in the containment area radioed that they saw Defendant north of 
the tire store near the Brighton Place Apartments. R902-03; see SE2.   
 Two officers stationed at the Brighton Place Apartment as part of the 
containment area saw Defendant—bald, wearing a maroon t-shirt, and 
jeans—jump over a fence into the Brighton Place Apartments and run. 
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R968,972-73,989-990. The officers chased Defendant through the apartment 
complex and found him in the courtyard. R973. When one officer asked 
Defendant for his name and tried to detain him, Defendant ran. R974-76. The 
officers then chased Defendant through the apartment complex. R978-979. As 
they chased him, both officers yelled at Defendant to “stop” and “taser, 
taser.” R976. One officer deployed his taser and hit Defendant, but Defendant 
ripped the taser cords off and kept running. R976-77. The officers chased 
Defendant to the back of the apartment complex and found him pacing by 
the fence line. R979,998; SE3. One officer told Defendant multiple times to 
“get on the ground,” but Defendant ignored him. R980. The other officer then 
tased Defendant twice. Id. The officers then arrested Defendant. Id. At the 
time of his arrest, Defendant’s hands were bloodied, and a .45 caliber Federal 
bullet was found in his pocket. R1002, 1164; SE121-122. Twenty-two minutes 
separated the shooting and Defendant’s arrest. R1160.  
 After Defendant’s arrest, the stolen truck was searched. Defendant’s 
identification, Ipad, fifteen guns, gun parts, and various makes, calibers, and 
types of ammunition, including four 9 mm bullets and various calibers of  
Ruger, Winchester, and  Federal bullets, were found. R1105-14,1136-40; 
SE73,160-189. Some, but not all, of the guns belonged the truck’s owner. 
R1121-30. But the truck’s owner had never owned a 9 mm handgun or 9 mm 
-11- 
ammunition. R1127,1130. One of the 9 mm bullets found in the truck was 
made by the same manufacturer as one of the bullet casings found at the 
shooting scene. R1146-1148; SE19,189  
 The Park Station Apartments—where Defendant jumped the retaining 
wall—were also searched. R911-13. Police found a Hi-point 9 mm handgun 
and its magazine on top of the covered parking near the place where 
Defendant jumped the retaining wall. R912-13; SE144; see also R1068-69 (At 
trial, Defendant stipulated that this weapon was used in the shooting). After 
the Park Station Apartments and the rest of the containment area were 
searched, approximately sixteen minutes after Defendant’s arrest, the 
containment area was dismantled. R1187.  
 The gun, magazine, and bullet casings recovered from the shooting 
scene were tested for touch DNA. R921-22. The DNA tests excluded 
Defendant from the magazine and could neither include or exclude 
Defendant from the gun and the casings. R923-26. 
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. 
  
 Defendant was charged with attempted aggravated murder, a first 
degree felony; receiving a stolen vehicle and obstructing justice, both second 
degree felonies; five counts of felony discharge of a firearm, all third degree 
-12- 
felonies; and failure to stop at the command of law enforcement, a class A 
misdemeanor. R35-37.  
 Motion to exclude the Federal bullet. During trial, Defendant moved 
to exclude the .45 caliber Federal bullet found in his pocket when he was 
arrested. R955. Defendant argued that admitting the bullet would be more 
prejudicial than probative under Utah R. Evid. 403. Id. The court denied 
Defendant’s motion. R964. The court did not rule that the evidence was not 
unfairly prejudicial given the totality of the evidence. Id.  
 Directed verdict motion. At the close of the State’s case, Defendant 
moved for a directed verdict. R1225. Defendant argued that the State had not 
proven that he was the shooter. Id. In response, the State argued that 
Defendant’s identity was established by O’Gwin’s dash cam showing 
Defendant wearing exactly what he’s wearing at the business center and 
firing in  Tsouras’ direction, that Defendant was found shortly after the 
shooting in the containment area, and that Defendant was the only person 
seen running through the tire store parking lot. R1225-26.  
 The trial court denied the motion. Id. The court acknowledged that 
“some” descriptions changed “from witness to witness.” R1226. However, 
the court found that  there  was “sufficient evidence” for a reasonable jury to 
convict Defendant even with the inconsistent descriptions because each 
-13- 
witness “had an opportunity” to observe Defendant and the State has “put 
on a prima facie case … for each of the counts as charged.” Id. 
 The jury then convicted Defendant as charged. R419-21.  
 Defendant’s merger motion. Following the jury’s verdict, Defendant 
moved to merge his five felony discharge of a firearm convictions with his 
attempted aggravated murder conviction. R435-45. The State opposed the 
motion. R448-51. But the State argued in the alternative that it was “fair to 
merge a single count of discharge of a firearm into the attempted aggravated 
murder charge and vacate that single count” because the basis for attempted 
aggravated murder could have been either the bullet that went into the 
driver-side headrest or the one that hit Tsouras. R451. 
 The court agreed with the State’s alternative argument. R490-91. The 
court merged one count of felony discharge of a firearm into Defendant’s 
attempted aggravated murder conviction then vacated that one count of 
felony discharge of a firearm. R491. 
 Sentencing. For his attempted aggravated murder conviction, the 
court sentenced Defendant to five-years-to-life in prison. R457. For his 
receiving a stolen vehicle and obstructing justice convictions, the court 
sentenced Defendant to two terms of one-to-fifteen-years in prison. R457-58. 
For his four felony discharge of a firearm convictions, the court sentenced 
-14- 
Defendant to four terms of zero-to-five-years in prison. R458. The court 
ordered Defendant’s attempted aggravated murder, receiving a stolen 
vehicle, and obstructing justice convictions to run consecutively, and his 
felony discharge of a firearm convictions to run concurrently to one another 
and to his other convictions. R458. For his failure to stop at the command of 
law enforcement conviction, the court ordered Defendant to serve 365 days 
in jail. R1395. 
 Defendant timely appealed. R466-67. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Point 1.  Defendant challenges his attempted aggravated murder and 
obstruction of justice convictions. He also challenges the trial court’s denial 
of his motion to exclude the Federal bullet found in his pocket.  
 In a preserved claim, Defendant argues that insufficient evidence 
supported his attempted aggravated murder conviction because the evidence 
was too circumstantial to identify him as the person who shot Officer 
Tsouras. Defendant’s claim fails. It is well-settled that circumstantial 
evidence alone is sufficient to establish guilt. And here, Defendant’s 
identification was supported by, among other evidence, multiple witnesses’ 
testimony that a person dressed the same or similarly to Defendant was the 
only person running from police and shot in Tsouras’s direction, videos, that 
-15- 
that one of the bullets found in the truck Defendant stole was made by the 
same manufacture as one of the bullet casings found at the scene, and that 
Defendant was arrested with bloody hands, a bullet in his pocket, and close 
in time and proximity to the shooting scene.  
  In an unpreserved claim, Defendant argues that insufficient evidence 
supported his obstruction of justice conviction because, like his attempted 
aggravated murder conviction, the evidence was too circumstantial identify 
him as the person who discarded the gun used to shoot Tsouras. On this 
record, Defendant cannot show that the insufficiency was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury. 
Ample evidence supported that Defendant discarded the gun, including that 
the gun used to shoot Tsouras was found next to where Defendant jumped 
the retaining wall between the tire store and the Park Station Apartments. 
 Defendant argues under Utah R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, and 404 that the 
trial court erred when it did not exclude the Federal bullet found in his 
pocket. Rules 401, 402, 403, and 404 apply to extrinsic evidence—evidence of 
other bad acts. Here, the bullet was intrinsic to Defendant’s crimes, thus, Utah 
R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, and 404 do not apply. The trial court properly admitted 
the bullet where it was found on Defendant’s person, tied him to the stolen 
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truck, and was evidence of his access to and familiarity with guns and 
ammunition.  
 Point 2. Below, the trial court merged one of Defendant’s five felony 
discharge of a firearm convictions with his attempted aggravated murder 
conviction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it did 
not merge his remaining four felony discharge of a firearm convictions with 
his attempted aggravated murder conviction.  
 Defendant’s claim fails because the aggravated murder statute 
explicitly prohibits merger of felony discharge of a firearm and aggravated 
murder. And Defendant’s conviction for the attempt crime does not change 
that analysis where a conviction for attempted aggravated murder must 
satisfy the aggravated murder statute elements, except that the murder need 






THE STATE PRODUCED AMPLE EVIDENCE TO LINK 
DEFENDANT TO THE SHOOTING OF A POLICE OFFICER AND 
CONCEALING THE EVIDENCE OF THE SHOOTING.  
 Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 
attempted aggravated murder and obstruction of justice convictions. 
Br.Aplt.13-30. In a preserved claim, Defendant argues that insufficient 
evidence supported his attempted aggravated murder conviction because the 
evidence was too circumstantial to identify him as the person who shot 
Officer Tsouras. Br.Aplt.13-27. In an unpreserved claim, Defendant argues 
that insufficient evidence supported his obstruction of justice conviction 
because, like his attempted aggravated murder conviction, the evidence was 
too circumstantial to identify him as the person who discarded the gun used 
to shoot Tsouras. Br.Aplt.27-30. Defendant also argues that the trial court 
erroneously rejected his argument that evidence that police found the Federal 
brand bullet in his pocket was more prejudicial than probative. Br.Aplt.30-43.  
But the evidence showed, among other things, that a person dressed 
the same or similarly to Defendant was the only person running from police 
and shot in Tsouras’s direction.  Police also found a 9mm bullet casing at the 
scene that was made by the same manufacture as one of the four 9mm bullets 
found in the truck Defendant had stolen.  The truck owner had never owned 
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a 9mm gun. While the casings found at the scene were not from Federal brand 
bullets, there were Federal brand bullets in the truck.  Finding a Federal brand 
bullet in Defendant’s truck was further circumstantial evidence linking him 
to the truck where police found a 9mm bullet bearing the same marking as 
those used to shoot and shoot at Officer Tsouras. 
A. Ample evidence supports Defendant’s attempted aggravated 
murder conviction.3 
    
 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court gives 
“substantial deference to the jury.” State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶18, 349 P.3d 
664 (quotation and citation omitted). This Court “reviews the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
verdict.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶177, 299 P.3d 892 (quotation and 
citation omitted). The existence of “contradictory evidence or of conflicting 
inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury’s verdict.” State v. Howell, 649 
P.2d 91, 96 (Utah 1982). So reviewed, evidence will not support a jury verdict 
only when it “is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime.” State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) 
(quotation and citation omitted). Thus, this Court must affirm if “some 
                                              
3 This Point responds to Defendant’s Point I. See Br.Aplt.13-30. 
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evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of 
the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 
¶177 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 It makes no difference whether the evidence is solely circumstantial.  
It is “well-settled” that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to establish 
guilt. State v. MacNeill, 2017 UT App 48, ¶57, 397 P.3d 626 (citation and 
quotation omitted). The State may present “a mosaic 
of circumstantial evidence that considered as a whole constitutes proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 
“Circumstantial evidence may even be more convincing than direct 
testimony.” State v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139, 140 (Utah 1978).  
  It is also “well-established” that identification can be proven from 
circumstantial evidence. State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ¶23 n.2, 354 P.3d 791. 
A “direct, in-court identification, therefore, is not required.” Id. A “witness 
need not physically point out a defendant so long as the evidence is sufficient 
to permit the inference that the person on trial was the person who committed 
the crime.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted); see also United States v. Smith, 
134 F.3d 384, *3, 1998 WL 33862, 98 CJ C.A.R. 548 (10th Cir. Jan. 29, 1998) 
(“[T]here is no requirement of an in-court identification when other evidence 
permits the inference that the defendant is the person who committed the 
-20- 
offense.”); United States v. Weed, 689 F.2d 752, 754 (7thCir.1982) 
(“[I]dentification can be inferred from all the facts and circumstances that are 
in evidence.”). 
 Here, more than “some evidence” established that Defendant shot and 
shot at Officer Tsouras. See Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶177 (emphasis added). 
Multiple witnesses described and video recordings captured a single person 
wearing jeans, a dark jacket, bandana, red or maroon shirt, and white shoes; 
when he was arrested, Defendant was still wearing jeans, a red shirt, and 
white shoes.  R797,855,867,941,973,1198-99,1210; SE12,147. 
Defendant, who admits that he was at the business center, was first 
captured on the business center’s surveillance video wearing a bandana, 
leather jacket, red or maroon shirt, blue jeans, and white shoes. R1310; SE12. 
Clark, who saw Defendant at the business center, described Defendant as a 
white male, in his thirties, wearing blues jeans, a bandana, and a leather 
jacket. R855. The night manager described the person she saw as “taller,” 
with a “pointed nose,” “sharp looking …wolf’s eyes,” wearing dark pants,” 
and a dark jacket—a description that matches Defendant’s facial features and 
clothing. R1195,1198-99; SE120. Tsouras and O’Gwin both described a person 
dressed the same or similarly to Defendant. Tsouras described the person he 
saw as wearing a “black jacket,” “blue jeans,” and “a beanie—skull cap—type 
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headgear.” R797. O’Gwin described the person he saw wearing blue jeans 
and a dark hoodie. R1210. And although O’Gwin’s dash cam did not capture 
Defendant’s face, it captured a person dressed like Defendant—wearing a 
dark jacket, blue jeans, and white shoes. SE147. Moreover, when Defendant 
was arrested, he was wearing a red or maroon t-shirt and blue jeans—exactly 
what he was wearing at the business center. R973; SE12.  
 The business center’s surveillance video and O’Gwin’s dash cam match 
the witnesses’ descriptions. The videos and Defendant’s post-arrest photo 
also show the same person. SE12,120,151-153. The witness descriptions are 
consistent and match what Defendant was wearing at different points in his 
crime spree. At the beginning of his crime spree, Defendant was wearing 
exactly what Clark, the night manager, Tsouras, and O’Gwin described and 
the business center and O’Gwin’s videos captured. At his arrest, Defendant 
was wearing the same red or maroon t-shirt, blue jeans, and white shoes that 
he wore at the business center, on O’Gwin’s dash cam video, and that the 
arresting officer described. Merely because Defendant started at the business 
center wearing a bandana, jacket, blue jeans, red or maroon shirt, and white 
shoes, but was arrested without the bandana or jacket, but still wearing blue 
jeans, a red or maroon shirt, and white shoes does not materially undermine 
the identification. It would have been reasonable for the jury to infer that 
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Defendant discarded his jacket and bandana as he ran. See Ashcraft, 2015 UT 
5, ¶18 (reasonable inferences may be drawn from circumstantial evidence). 
As the arresting officer explained, when suspects run from the police they 
often discard items and items like hats are easily lost. R985.  
 The identification was also not materially undermined by Midgely’s 
testimony that he “thought” the person he saw running from police was 
wearing a light-colored jacket, not a dark jacket like the other witnesses 
described. R952-53. See Brown, 948 P.2d at 343 (variation in witnesses 
testimony does not make it “sufficiently inconclusive” or “inherently 
improbable.”) (quotation and citation omitted); Howell, 649 P.2d at 96 
(“existence of contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences does not 
warrant disturbing the jury's verdict”) (quotation and citation omitted). As 
Midgely explained, he was not focused on what Defendant was wearing, but 
on what he was doing. R952-53. Midgely’s vantage point and the lighting also 
explain the difference in his description—he was the furthest away and 
watching Defendant run at night through parking lots. R938-942; SE13 (taco 
bell across the street from shooting site),145. And the remaining witnesses 
were materially consistent with each other. 
 O’Gwin’s dash cam video also supports the identification of Defendant 
as the shooter. As stated, the dash cam did not capture Defendant’s face. But 
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it did capture a person dressed in the same clothes that Defendant wore at 
the business center firing his gun in the direction that Tsouras retreated when 
Defendant started shooting. R804-05,1211-13,1221-23, SE12,142,147. 
 The bullet casings found at the scene and the ammunition found in 
truck Defendant had stolen also linked him to the crimes. Defendant 
admitted at trial that he was connected to the stolen truck. SE73. Indeed, 
Defendant’s identification and Ipad were found inside. R1105;  SE73,160. And 
the stolen truck connects Defendant to the shooting. One of the bullet casings 
found at the scene matched one of the four 9 mm bullets found in the stolen 
truck. R1147-48. The truck’s owner testified that the 9 mm bullets were not 
his, and that he had never owned a 9 mm gun. R1130. The stolen truck also 
contained various calibers of Winchester ammunition—the other type of 9 
mm ammunition used in the shooting. R110, SE173-175. And like the .45 
caliber Federal bullet in Defendant’s pocket, the stolen truck contained 
Federal bullets. R1112; SE175,176,179,186,189.  
 Additionally, Defendant’s flight from police is evidence that he was the 
one who shot Tsouras. State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 38-39 (Utah 1987) 
(overturned on other grounds by State v. Robertson, 2017 UT 27); State v. Bales, 
675 P.2d 573, 574 (Utah 1983).  Defendant was the only person in the area 
running and the only person in the containment area that matched the 
-24- 
shooter’s description. R795,940,1162-63,1195,1214; SE147. Defendant was 
arrested only twenty-two minutes after the shooting, in the containment area, 
near the shooting site, with bloodied hands and a bullet in his pocket. 
R980,1002,1160,1164; SE121,122.  
 Last, Defendant offered no innocent explanation for running from 
police or for the injuries to his hand. Compare SE12,151-153 with 120-122. 
 Thus, the evidence—the surveillance and dash cam videos, the witness 
testimony identifying a person wearing the same or similar clothing, that one 
of the 9 mm bullets at the scene was made by the same manufacteur as one 
of the four 9 mm bullets found in the truck Defendant stole, that Defendant 
was the only person in the area, Defendant’s flight from police, Defendant’s 
own admissions, and that Defendant was arrested with bloody hands, a 
bullet in his pocket, and close in time and proximity to the shooting scene—
established that Defendant shot Tsouras.    
 Regardless, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient 
because there were some inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony 
describing Defendant. Br.Aplt.22-27. Inconsistencies are not enough to 
disturb the jury’s verdict—the inconsistencies must be improbable with no 
other circumstantial or direct evidence supporting the verdict. State v. Prater, 
2017 UT 13, ¶¶32,42 392 P.3d 398. But Defendant’s argument focuses only on 
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alleged inconsistencies and ignores the totality of the evidence supporting his 
identification. See MacNeill, 2017 UT App 48, ¶57 (To prove guilt, the State 
may present “a mosaic of circumstantial evidence.”). And as explained, 
ample evidence supports Defendant’s identification. Thus, Defendant’s claim 
fails.   
B. The trial court did not plainly err by not sua sponte taking the 
obstruction of justice charge from the jury.  
 
 For the first time on appeal, Defendant challenges his obstruction of 
justice conviction, arguing that there was insufficient identification evidence 
to show that he discarded the gun. Br.Aplt.27-30. Defendant’s claim fails 
because he cannot show plain error—obvious, prejudicial error. 
 1. Defendant’s claim is unpreserved.  
 Defendant argues that his claim was preserved by his trial counsel’s 
directed verdict motion. Defendant is mistaken.  
 A party generally cannot raise an issue on appeal that it did not 
properly preserve in the trial court. Oseguera v. State, 2014 UT 31,¶10, 332 P.3d 
963. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must present the issue in “‘the 
district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it].’” 
Id. (quoting Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, ¶45, 323 P.3d 998). In other words, 
a party’s objection must be both timely and specific. See id. The specificity 
requirement prevents a party from raising an issue on one ground but 
-26- 
arguing another ground on appeal. See id. (party objecting “on one ground 
does not preserve any alternative grounds for objection for appeal”) (quoting 
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶17, 192 P.3 867). 
 In his directed verdict motion, Defendant argued that “there’s not 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that [Defendant] is, in fact, the person that fired at the officer that day.” R1225. 
Defendant did not argue, as he does on appeal, that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove that he was the person who discarded the gun—the 
evidentiary basis for the obstruction charge. Br.Aplt.27-30. Defendant did not 
present this issue to the trial court, and the trial court did not have the 
opportunity to rule on it. See Oseguera, 2014 UT 31,¶10. Defendant’s claim is 
thus unpreserved. See id.  
 2. Defendant has not shown—and cannot show—
that the trial court should have taken the 
obstruction of justice charge from the jury on its 
own motion. 
 To prevail on a preserved insufficiency claim on appeal, Defendant 
must show that the “evidence…is sufficiently inconclusive” or “inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt.” 
State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ¶65, 27 P.3d 1115 (citations and quotations omitted).  
When, as here, Defendant’s claim is unpreserved, Defendant’s burden is even 
higher. Defendant must also show that the “insufficiency was so obvious and 
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fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury.” State 
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶17, 10 P.3d 346. 
 Defendant has shown no obvious and fundamental insufficiency of the 
evidence. O’Gwin testified that, and his dash cam captured, Defendant, 
shooting his gun toward Tsouaras, then jumping the retaining wall between 
the tire store and the Park Station Apartments. R1213-14; SE147. Defendant’s 
gun and magazine were found practically next to where he jumped the 
retaining wall. R912-13; SE144.  
 And as explained, Defendant’s identification is supported by the 
surveillance and dash cam videos, the seven witnesses descriptions of 
Defendant, that he was the only person in the area, he fled from police, he 
had access to and familiarity with guns and ammunition, and that he was 
arrested near the shooting scene only twenty-two minutes after the shooting, 
his hands bloodied and a bullet in his pocket. R795,797,855,941,953-54,972-
73,1002,1105-14,1160,1162-64,1195,1210-13; SE12,121-122,147,151-153,158160-
189. Given this evidence, the trial court did not err—plainly or otherwise—
by not sua sponte taking the charge from the jury.  
 Regardless, Defendant argues that this evidence is insufficient to prove 
that Defendant discarded the gun. Br.Aplt.31-32. But direct evidence of 
Defendant discarding the gun was not required. See MacNeill, 2017 UT App 
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48, ¶57 (circumstantial evidence alone sufficient to prove guilt).  The totality 
of the circumstantial evidence was more than enough to prove Defendant’s 
identity. See id. And the jury agreed. “It is the exclusive function of the jury 
to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” 
Mead, 2001 UT 58, ¶67. That is exactly what the jury did here. See State v. 
Johnson, 2015 UT App 312, ¶12, 365 P.3d 730 (a jury is not obligated to believe 
Defendant’s version of events). Thus, Defendant cannot show that the 
evidence was insufficient, let alone obviously and fundamentally so. See 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶17. 
 C. The trial court acted well within its discretion when it denied 
Defendant’s motion to exclude the Federal bullet because the 
bullet was evidence that linked Defendant to the crimes.4 
  
 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not excluding the Federal 
bullet found in his pocket when he was arrested. He argues that the bullet 
was inadmissible under rule 404(b) as evidence of another crime.  He argues 
that the bullet was evidence of his proclivities. Br.Aplt.30-44. Defendant’s 
claim fails because rule 404 does not apply to evidence that is intrinsic to the 
                                              
4 This Point responds to Defendant’s Point II. See Br. Aplt. 30-44. 
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charged crime.  And the Federal bullet was intrinsic, not extrinsic, to 
Defendant’s crimes.5 
 Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that evidence “of a 
crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in 
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity 
with the character.” Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1). To determine whether a 
defendant’s other bad acts are admissible under rule 404(b), the trial court 
must determine whether the evidence is offered for a genuine, noncharacter 
purpose; whether the evidence is relevant under rule 402 to a contested issue; 
and whether the probative value of the  evidence is substantially outweighed 
by the risk of unfair prejudice under rule 403. See State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 
15,¶¶14, 17, 328 P.3d 841 (abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 
UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016).  
 But it is “well-settled” that rule 404(b) applies to the admissibility of 
evidence extrinsic to the charged offenses and does not apply to “evidence 
that is intrinsic to the crime charged.” United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 
1309,1314 (10th Cir. 2009) accord United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822,831 (10th 
                                              
5 Below, the State argued that the bullet was admissible under Utah R. 
Evid. 404(b). R955-64. This Court can affirm any on basis apparent in the 
record. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶13, 52 P.3d 1158. 
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Cir. 1999). See also Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶14 n.7 (explaining that “rule 404(b) 
applies only “‘to evidence that is extrinsic to the crime charged’”) (quoting 
United States v. Mower, 351 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1230 (D. Utah 2005)); State v. 
Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ¶65, 256 P.3d 1102 (same). Evidence is extrinsic 
“[w]hen the other crimes or wrongs occur at different times and under 
different circumstances from the offense charged.” Burke, 2011 UT App 168, 
¶65. Evidence is intrinsic if it is “directly connected to the factual 
circumstances of the crime,” Parker, 553 F.3d at 1314 (citation omitted);  
“necessary to complete the story of the crime,” United States v. McKinley, 647 
Fed. Appx. 957,962 (11thCir. 2016); “inextricably intertwined with the 
evidence of the crime charged,” Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ¶65 (quotation and 
citation omitted); or provides “contextual or background information to the 
jury.” United States v. Irving, 665 F.3d 1184, 1212 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 Here, the Federal bullet was intrinsic, not extrinsic, to Defendant’s 
crimes. It was not another crime or wrong that occurred at a different time 
and circumstance from the offenses charged. It was part of Defendant’s 
crimes. See Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ¶65.  
 Twenty-two minutes after Defendant shot Tsouras, police found the 
bullet in Defendant’s pocket when they arrested and searched him. 
R1002,1160. Various calibers of the same brand of ammunition were found in 
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the truck Defendant stole and parked at the business center. R1105-14,1136-
40; SE160-189. This evidence ties Defendant to the business center, where he 
ran from Clark, just before shooting Tsouras. R854; SE11. The bullet also links 
him to the stolen truck and the guns and ammunition inside of it. One of the 
9 mm bullets found inside of the truck matched one of the bullets fired at 
Tsouras. R1146-48; SE189. And the truck contained various calibers of 
Winchester ammunition, the same manufacturer of the other five bullets shot 
at Tsouras. R1110; SE173-176. By linking Defendant to the guns and 
ammunition in the truck, the State provided further proof that it was 
Defendant who shot at Tsouras.  
 Additionally, because Defendant had the bullet in his pocket and the 
truck he stole was filled with guns and ammunition proved that he had access 
to guns and was familiar with them. Defendant’s access and familiarity is 
further proof his identity as the shooter. Thus, the Federal bullet was directly 
connected to the factual circumstances of Defendant’s crimes, “inextricably 
intertwined” with the evidence, and provided the jury with contextual 
information. See Irving, 665 F.3d 1184; Parker, 553 F.3d at 1314; Burke, 2011 UT 
App 168, ¶65; McKinley, 647 Fed. Appx. at 962. 
 Defendant also argues that the trial court should have excluded the 
evidence under rule 403.  But he has not shown that the potential for unfair 
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prejudice substantially outweighed the bullet’s probative value.  As argued, 
finding the bullet in Defendant’s pocket was evidence linking him to the 
crime.  The “prejudice,” then, was that it was further evidence of his guilt—
it helped establish his familiarity with firearms, and more importantly, it was 
further proof linking him to the truck where police found other ammunition 
that more directly tied Defendant to the shooting.  Evidence of guilt is not 
unfairly prejudicial.6 United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th 
Cir.2001) (“evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is 
detrimental to a party’s case”).  
 Defendant also has not shown that admitting the bullet prejudiced him.  
To prove prejudice, Defendant must show that there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result had the trial court not admitted the bullet. State 
v. Courtney, 2017 UT App 172, ¶22, --P.2d --. Given the totality of the evidence, 
                                              
6 Defendant’s argument looks to the Shickles factors. Br.Aplt.37-39. He 
says that State did not need the evidence because other evidence linked him 
to the truck and the bullet had the potential to lead the jury into 
“overmastering hostility.” Id. But the Shickles factors have been disavowed 
as the standard for determining admissibility under rule 403. State v. Lucero, 
2014 UT 15, ¶32, 17, 328 P.3d 841 (abrogated on other grounds by State v. 
Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016).  And the supreme court has expressly 
rejected the “overmastering hostility” inquiry. State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, 
¶20, 367 P.3d 981 
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the admission of the bullet did not create a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome.  
 The jurors heard from 18 witnesses over three days and reviewed 191 
exhibits. R760-1364; SE1-191. The jurors heard testimony that Defendant stole 
guns and ammunition from the truck owner’s home, many of the guns and 
ammunition in the stolen truck were not the truck owner’s, the truck owner 
never owned 9 mm ammunition—the caliber of ammunition used to shoot 
and shoot at Tsouras—and did not own the 9 mm ammunition in the truck. 
R1122-1130. Along with the guns and ammunition in the truck, Defendant’s 
identification and Ipad were in the truck. R1104-05; SE73. Thus, the jury could 
reasonably infer that Defendant owned the guns and ammunition not owned 
by the truck owner and Defendant was familiar with and had access to 
weapons. See Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶18 (jury can draw reasonable inferences 
from circumstantial evidence). 
 Of the exhibits, the jurors heard the dispatch recording of Tsouras 
calling out “shots fired,” saw photos and video surveillance of Defendant at 
the business center, the dash cam video of Defendant firing a gun towards 
Tsouras and running from O’Gwin, 19 photos of bullet casings, 62 photos of 
Tsouras’s bullet-ridden patrol car, 36 photos of guns and ammunition, photos 
of Defendant’s bloodied hands, photos of Tsouras’ bullet damaged uniform, 
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the bullet-pierced Kevlar plate from Tsouras’s bulletproof vest, and 
numerous bullets and casings recovered from the shooting and stolen vehicle 
scene. SE11-189. 
  Given this evidence, Defendant cannot show prejudice. And, the 
exclusion of one more bullet found in Defendant’s pocket at the time of his 
arrest did not create a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. 















THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S 
MOTION TO MERGE HIS FOUR FELONY DISCHARGE OF A 
FIREARM CONVICTIONS WITH HIS ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED 
MURDER CONVICTION BECAUSE THE AGGRAVATED MURDER 
STATUTE EXPLICITLY PROHIBITS MERGER. 7 
  Below, Defendant argued that all five of his felony discharge of a 
firearm convictions should merge with his attempted aggravated murder 
conviction. R435. The State argued in the alternative that if any counts merge, 
one count could merge based on the State’s closing argument. R448-51. The 
trial court agreed with the State and merged one of Defendant’s felony 
discharge of a firearm convictions with his attempted murder conviction. 
R490-91. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it did 
not merge his four remaining felony discharge of a firearm convictions with 
his attempted aggravated murder conviction. Br.Aplt.44-54. Defendant’s 
claims fail. 8 
 The aggravated murder statute expressly precludes felony discharge 
of a firearm from merging. The aggravated merger statute states that: 
 
                                              
7 This point responds to Defendant’s Point III. See Br. Aplt. 44-54  
 8 As explained below, merger is inapplicable, thus, Defendant received 
a windfall when the trial court partially granted his motion.  
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Any aggravating circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2) 
that constitutes a separate offense does not merge with the crime 
of aggravated murder.  A person who is convicted of aggravated 
murder, based on an aggravating circumstance . . . that 
constitutes a separate offense, may also be convicted of, and 
punished for, the separate offense.  
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(5)(West 2015). 
 Subsection (1)(j) lists, among other crimes, felony discharge of a firearm 
as an aggravating circumstance. Id. (j)(xvii). Felony discharge of a firearm is 
a separate offense from aggravated murder. See Utah Code Ann. §76-10-508.1 
(West 2017). Thus, under the plain language of the statute, Defendant’s 
convictions cannot merge.  
 And the Utah Supreme Court agrees. In State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶67, 
361 P.3d 104, Bond sought to merge his aggravated kidnapping and 
aggravated murder convictions. The supreme court held that under the 
aggravated murder statute, the offenses did not merge because the statute 
exempted aggravated kidnapping from merging. Id. at ¶¶69-70. The court 
explained that the “plain language” of the aggravated murder statute “can 
leave no doubt” that an aggravating circumstance “does not merge with the 
homicide conviction.” Id. at ¶71.   
 Like Bond, here, Defendant’s crimes did not merge because felony 
discharge of a firearm, like aggravated kidnapping, is listed as an aggravating 
circumstance in the aggravated murder statute. See Utah Code Ann. §76-5-
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202(1)(j)(v), (1)(j)(xvii). Thus, like Bond, the aggravated murder statute 
precludes felony discharge of a firearm from merging with aggravated 
murder.  
 Moreover, it is immaterial that Defendant was convicted of attempted 
aggravated murder, not aggravated murder. The offenses do not merge 
because “[a]ttempt crimes,” like attempted aggravated murder, are only 
“derivatives of completed crimes, and the express language of both the 
completed crime statute and the attempt statute determines the elements of 
the attempt crime.” State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ¶13, 82 P.3d 1106. Thus, a 
conviction for attempted aggravated murder must satisfy the elements of the 
aggravated murder statute, “with the obvious exception that the murder 
need not be completed, and the attempt statute.” Id.  
 In sum, the trial court did not err by not merging Defendant’s 
attempted aggravated murder and felony discharge of a firearm convictions 
because the statute explicitly prohibits it.  
  
CONCLUSION  
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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 Respectfully submitted on May 15, 2018. 
  SEAN D. REYES 
  Utah Attorney General 
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